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Abstract
This paper presents a formal framework in which to
study the socialization processes evolving among utility-
based agents. These agents are self-interested, being their
different social attitudes (cooperativeness, competitiveness
or indifference) a consequence of this behavior. The dynam-
ics of the socialization process are captured by a relation
that measures the similarities between the desires of two
groups of agents. This similitude relation is derived from the
system’s model, defined as a probabilistic transition system
and a set of individual preference relations. Game-theoretic
concepts are used in order to determine the rational (or ex-
pected) transitions of the system.
1. Introduction
The work presented in this paper concerns the study of
the socialization process among utility-based agents. Find-
ing the results of this process consists in determining the so-
cial attitudes that each agent or group of agents exhibits to-
wards the other elements of the society. Traditionally, soft-
ware agents are designed to play a specific role in a prede-
fined society. Under this perspective, the socialization prob-
lem is of no interest since the social attitude of an agent is
fixed and it is a direct consequence of its role. In the design
of a multi-agent system, the existence of a common problem
to be solved usually results in a benevolence assumption,
that states that all the system’s agents are equally commit-
ted in solving a problem the best they can. This traditional
way of viewing multi-agent systems is gradually disappear-
ing, in particular due to the fact that the software world is
becoming extremely dynamic and diverse; software agents
should be prepared to inter-operate in a changing and het-
erogeneous environment, and their social attitudes should
change according to the problems being solved and the in-
volved parties.
According to their social attitudes, agents are usually di-
vided into categories [3]: cooperative, if they try to maxi-
mize the welfare of a group of agents; self-interested, if they
only care about its own interests and welfare; and hostile or
competitive, if the maximization of its welfare implies the
decrease of the others’ satisfaction. An utility-based agent
acts according to the principle of expected utility maximiza-
tion, and, consequently, it is always a self-interested entity.
Cooperativeness or competitiveness may still exist, but only
as an indirect consequence of this self-interested behavior.
One’s view of the agent’s socialization problem relies on
this assumption, and the algorithm to be described attempts
to determine and analyze such indirect social attitude.
2. Modeling societies of utility-based agents
The proposedmodel of utility-basedmulti-agent systems
is based on classical concepts of game [2] and concurrency
theory [4]. Transition systems are used as a starting point
for the model. The agents’ beliefs are represented by in-
formation partitions, a concept widely used in game-theory
to represent the beliefs of the players. The desires of an
agent are assessed by a simple real-valued utility function
defined over states. Some agents may prefer to reach a state
within a short period of time, than a state with higher
utility within a larger one. To capture this kind of time
preference, discount factors are also incorporated into the
model. Nondeterminism is modeled by assigning a lottery
to the possible outcomes of executing an action. will
denote the set of all possible lotteries defined over the set of
states .
Definition 1 A model of a utility-based multi-agent system
is an octet
where is an ordered set of agent names;
is a set of world states, being the initial state;
is a set of possible action labels, where
represents the set of the possible actions of agent and
represents the null action; defines
the transition relation over the state space (it is a partial
function, once it may be impossible for a given group of
agents to execute a particular action in a given state);
is an indexed set with the utility functions, where
; is an indexed set with
the discount factors; is an indexed set of
information partitions.
Since that in each state all the agents choose their ac-
tions simultaneously, the states of the transition system will
be modeled by the normal-form representation of a static
game. The solution concept that will be used in order to de-
termine the strategies that will be followed in each of these
games is that of the Nash equilibrium [1].
Suppose that a given joint-strategy was accorded to be
executed by a group of agents. In each state , deter-
mines which joint action will be executed in state . If the
system is deterministic, and the initial state is , the execu-
tion trace that would be induced by this strategy is
The expected utility for agent , if is executed, would
be the weighted sum
If only the first states are considered when calculating
the expected utility of an agent, the percentage of the total
weight that will be covered is
If the reverse process is adopted, that is, if the percentage
of the total weight that is to be analyzed (the parameter )
is specified in the first place, then it is possible to determine
the number of states that should be looked ahead when
determining the reward of an agent’s decision. The param-
eter can be viewed either as the confidence one has in the
expected utility that is being calculated, or as the measure of
the bounded rationality of the system’s agents. A value near
characterizes a system where the agents have very limited
resources, and a value near characterizes a system where
the agents are almost perfect reasoners. After determining
, the equilibrium strategies (and hence the rational transi-
tions) should be evaluated by backward induction, starting
at the states that are situated actions ahead from the initial
state .
3. Agent socialization
The social attitudes that emerge in a multi-agent system
will be represented through a similitude relation, which ex-
presses the similarities between the agents desires.
Definition 2 The similitude relation between two groups of
agents, in a multi-agent system ,
is expressed by the function
which is to be understood as a measure of the similitude
among the desires of both groups. A negative result means
that the first group acts in a competitive or hostile manner
towards the second group. A similitude of means that the
attitudes of the first group do not influence the satisfaction
of the second. A positive result indicates a cooperative be-
havior. is the result’s confidence value.
Given a procedure to determine the expected or ratio-
nal transitions of a system (such as the one presented in the
previous section), the process of determining ,
under , may now be stated as follows: (1) Determine
the rational transitions of the multi-agent system with
confidence value . (2) Determine the average expected
utility for all agents in . (3) Define a model ,
similar to , taking into consideration only the actions
that do not had active participation by agents in ; i.e.
with
, where denotes the ’s contribution to
the joint-action . (4) Determine the rational transitions of
the multi-agent system with confidence value . (5) De-
termine the average expected utility for all agents in ,
taking into account the rational traces of . (6) Evaluate
.
Consider the following example: imagine that one wants
to build an agent , by assembling two independent and sim-
pler utility based agents named, respectively, and . The
question that may arise is which of the agents should be
used, such that the final agent will act as expected. The
solution to this problem consists in finding and among
the available instances such that is max-
imized. If, given two models for the agents and , one is
asked if and are a good choice to build the agent , then
one has to prove that .
References
[1] J. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 36:48–49, 1950.
[2] E. Rasmusen. Games and Information: an Introduction to
Game Theory. Basil Blackwell, 1989.
[3] T. Sandholm and V. R. Lesser. On automated contracting in
multi-enterprise manufacturing. In Improving Manufacturing
Performance in a Distributed Enterprise: Advanced Systems
and Tools, pages 33–42, Edimburgh, Scotland, 1995.
[4] G. Winskel and M. Nielsen. Models of concurrency. In
S. Abramsky, D. M. Gabbay, and T. S. E. Maibaum, editors,
Handbook of Logic in Computer Science, volume 4, pages 1–
148. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995.
